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 NAGARJUNA'S THEORY OF CAUSALITY:
 IMPLICATIONS SACRED AND PROFANE
 Jay L. Garfield
 Department of Philosophy, Smith College, and School of Philosophy, University of
 Tasmania
 Introduction
 Ndgdrjuna properly emphasizes that one understands the fundamental nature of
 reality (or lack thereof, depending on one's perspective) if, and only if, one under-
 stands the nature of dependent origination:
 Whoever sees dependent arising
 Also sees suffering
 And its arising
 And its cessation as well as the path. (XXIV:40)
 And he devotes two important chapters of the MalamadhyamakakjrikJ to the anal-
 ysis of causality per se and of dependent arising more generally. The analysis
 developed in these chapters permeates the rest of the treatise. I have largely said my
 piece about how these chapters are to be read and about their role in Nagdrjuna's
 larger philosophical enterprise (Garfield 1990, 1994, 1995). I will review that ac-
 count only briefly here as a preliminary to some applications.
 I think not only that Nagarjuna is right about the fundamental importance of
 causality, and of dependence more generally, to our understanding of reality and of
 human life but also that his own account of these matters is generally correct. Given
 these two premises, it follows that our conduct of natural science as well as the
 pursuit of our moral life should be informed by Nagarjuna's account of these matters.
 Here, I will develop some of these implications. I caution, however, that my devel-
 opment, at least in the case of ethics, is heterodox-although, as I will argue, abso-
 lutely orthodox Madhyamaka-within at least one major living tradition in which
 Madhyamaka is preserved and practiced: the dGe lugs pa school of Tibetan Bud-
 dhism. As a consequence, we will have reason to question both certain substantive
 claims made within that tradition about the necessary conditions of the cultivation of
 bodhicitta and the doxographic strategy of the tradition.
 My claims about the philosophy of science may be less controversial, but will
 nonetheless offend some. And that (on both counts) is as it should be. For the phi-
 losophy of science has been steadily maturing into a more Buddhist framework over
 the past few decades (even if most Western philosophers of science would not rec-
 ognize that characterization). But there are residues of pre-Buddhist modernism in
 practice, and even those who opt for a more enlightened approach to these matters
 do not always see the big picture.
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 I will first sketch Nagarjuna's view. The account will be straightforward, and I
 will not defend my reading any further here. I will then turn to the implications of
 this view for the philosophy of science, arguing that Nagarjuna's account of inter-
 dependence shows how we can clearly understand the nature of scientific explana-
 tion, the relationship between distinct levels of theoretical analysis in the sciences
 (with particular attention to cognitive science), and how we can sidestep difficulties
 in understanding the relations between apparently competing ontologies induced by
 levels of description or explanation supervening on one another.
 Finally, I will examine rGyal tshab's exposition of DharmakTrti's account, in the
 pramanasiddhi chapter of the Prampnavarttika, of the necessity of a belief in rebirth
 for the cultivation of bodhicitta. This account is accepted in the dGe lugs tradition
 both as an accurate representation of DharmakTrti's views and as authoritative re-
 garding bodhicitta and the mahakarunJ, which is its necessary condition. But, I will
 argue, DharmakTrti, rGyal tshab, and their followers are, by virtue of accepting this
 argument, neglecting Nagarjuna's account of dependent arising and in consequence
 are implicated in what might be seen from a proper Prasangika-Madhyamaka point
 of view as the very subtlest form of self-grasping. We can use Nagdrjuna's account to
 extirpate this final self-grasping, thus freeing the morally central notion of bodhicitta
 from unnecessary and perhaps implausible metaphysical and cosmological baggage.
 This also suggests some caution regarding a doxography that takes as axiomatic the
 consistency of DharmakTrti's pramanavada and Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka. We will
 conclude with a few observations on common lessons emerging from these appli-
 cations of Ndgarjuna's insights in two such radically different domains.
 The Emptiness of Causality
 Nagarjuna is often erroneously understood as a nihilist with respect to causality and
 dependent arising. On this misreading he is taken to argue that in fact there are no
 relationships of mutual dependence among phenomena, and even that no phenom-
 ena in fact exist. Nothing could be further from the truth. Ndgdrjuna assiduously
 defends the co-relativity of emptiness and dependent arising, and insists that to say
 that all phenomena are empty just is to say that they are dependently arisen:
 Whatever is dependently co-arisen
 That is explained to be emptiness,
 That, being a dependent designation,
 Is itself the middle way.
 Something that is not dependently arisen,
 Such a thing does not exist.
 Therefore a nonempty thing
 Does not exist. (XXIV:18-19)
 Since nobody-particularly anyone who would offer a nihilistic reading of
 N~garjuna with respect to the conventional world and pratitya-samutpada-would
 seriously claim that N~garjuna denies the emptiness of all phenomena, nobody who
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 reads the Malamadhyamakakarika through to the end could seriously defend the
 nihilistic reading.
 Since one of the principal phenomena that Nagarjuna analyzes as empty is
 causation, it is not surprising that some read the first chapter of the Malamadhya-
 makakarika as an attack on the reality of causation. After all, in the very first verse he
 asserts:
 Neither from itself nor from another,
 Nor from both,
 Nor without a cause,
 Does anything whatever, anywhere arise. (1:1)
 But again, given a correct middle-path reading of Ndgdrjuna's program, we can
 see immediately that such a reading must be erroneous. Ndgdrjuna's strategy
 throughout the MOlamadhyamakakdrikJ is to argue that the phenomena we normally
 take to be inherently existent, to have convention-independent natures, and to exist
 as they do precisely because of their natures are in fact empty of inherent existence,
 exist only conventionally, and exist precisely because of their emptiness and inter-
 dependence. To quote a favorite Tibetan Prdsangika-Madhyamaka saw: we do not
 say that because things are empty that they do not exist; we say that because things
 exist they are empty. The converse, of course, is equally assertible.
 Now, as I have argued before, in the case of causation, in chapter 1 of the
 MalamadhyamakakarikJ, Nagarjuna proceeds by distinguishing hetu (rgyu) from
 pratyaya (kyen). He uses the former term to denote the cause of the meta-
 physicians-an event capable of bringing about another by virtue of a power that is
 part of its nature. The latter denotes an event or phenomenon whose occurrence or
 existence is correlated with that of another-a condition:
 These give rise to those,
 So these are called conditions. (I: 5a, b)
 "When this arises, so does that. When this ceases, so does that." Of course
 Nagdrjuna identifies four kinds of conditions, in rough harmony with standard Bud-
 dhist taxonomies of causality (for more detail see Garfield 1995). He argues that the
 midpoint between reification of causation-the adoption of a realistic view with re-
 spect to causal powers-and nihilism-the view of a random and inexplicable uni-
 verse of independent events-is the acceptance of the reality of conditions, and a
 regularist account of explanation. On such a view, what counts as explanans and as
 explanandum depends on explanatory interests and upon conventions for individu-
 ation and classification. Hume is often read (properly in my view) in roughly this
 way. Such a view is, hence, far from a nihilism. This is instead a moderate, sensible
 approach to explanation and to understanding.
 N~garjuna's reasons for rejecting causal powers anticipate the arguments of
 Hume and of Wittgenstein: causal powers are never observed; causal powers, if
 sufficient for explanation, can never inhere in isolated events or things, which
 always require cooperating conditions; causal powers cannot be explanatory on
 Jay L. Garfield 509
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 pain of regress (what would explain the arising of the powers, or their giving rise to
 effects?); and positing causal powers imposes implausible uniformity on the explan-
 atory landscape. These arguments are by now familiar, if still controversial, and this
 analysis of the first chapter of the Malamadhyamakakarika is by now familiar, if still
 controversial. I have defended these positions elsewhere (Garfield 1990, 1994,
 1995), and merely recall them here in order to use them as a platform for extension.
 Nagarjuna's conventionalist regularism, when joined with his eclectic view
 about the dimensions of explanation represented in the account of the four kinds of
 conditions (efficient, supporting, immediately preceding, and dominant), gives rise to
 a reasonably straightforward analysis of explanatory and predictive language: we
 explain a phenomenon when we identify it as of a kind; when we connect occur-
 rences of things of that kind with the occurrence of other related phenomena; when
 we connect the macroscopic and easily observable with the microscopic and
 harder-to-observe; and when we place it within a network of events, purposes, and
 connections that form patterns enabling rational action, prediction, and cognitive
 access to the world.
 The serious causal realist (really a reificationist in Ndgdrjuna's sense) can be
 expected to press against Ndgdrjuna the obvious question for any such regularist:
 what explains these regularities, if not genuine causal powers inhering in genuine
 causes?' After all, anyone who is even as realistic as Nagarjuna, and as committed to
 the enterprise of explanation as Nagarjuna, must be committed to explaining why
 the explanans appealed to in any explanation in fact explains and, in the end, why
 the world is regular at all. Appeal to causes and their powers would do this; anything
 less leaves the entire structure mysterious.2
 Ndgarjuna's reply in chapter VII of the Malamadhyamakakarika is straightfor-
 ward: each regularity, each pattern, each connection posited in any explanation
 must indeed be explicable. That is the content of pratitya-samutpjda. But each is
 explained by still further regularities, patterns, connections. Deeper understanding
 consists of the increasingly richer embedding of interdependence into larger, more
 articulated patterns of interdependence. And there simply is no explanation of
 why the entire universe is interdependent. There is no such well-defined totality to
 explain:
 The arisen, the nonarisen, and that which is arising
 Do not arise in any way at all.
 Thus they should be understood
 Just like the gone, the not-gone and the going. (VII: 14)
 If another arising gives rise to this one,
 There would be an infinite regress. (VII: 19a, b)
 That is the problem of the limits leading to the unanswerable questions. Explanatory
 questions are always local. Attempting transcendental explanations of the possibility of
 explanation is not only fruitless, it is meaningless: what could explain why explanation
 itself is possible? Certainly not powers. What could explain them, or, more deeply,
 their explanatory potential, if not the patterns into which they are embedded?
 510 Philosophy East & West
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 We have, then, in the Malamadhyamakakirikr, articulated principally in chapters I
 and VII but supported in a myriad of ways throughout the text, an account of explana-
 tion and causation that, like Hume's, grounds ontology in the conventions that underlie
 our explanatory interests and the sortals we choose under which to collect entities, and
 not in a self-evident or self-presenting partition of nature into things, properties, and
 relations. This is, of course, an ancient view, developed and defended long before the
 rise of modern science. For all of that, it provides a natural and compelling guide to
 the landscape of the world as captured by the scientific image. Let us now turn to the
 important implications of this way of seeing things for contemporary science.
 A Madhyamaka View of Scientific Explanation and Ontology
 If we survey the world as it is understood in contemporary science, and contempo-
 rary science as it develops in order to understand the world, we are immediately
 struck by the fact that from whichever way we approach the enterprise-whether
 from the standpoint of theory or from that of the object(s) of theory-multiple
 levels of explanation or of ontology present themselves. Economics, sociology,
 anthropology, psychology, neuroscience, ecology, cell biology, physiology, chem-
 istry, fluid dynamics, macrophysics, and quantum theory each proceed and indeed
 progress. Each develops a proprietary vocabulary, methodology, explanatory strat-
 egy, and ontology. We have become accustomed-or at least we had better become
 accustomed-not only to the peaceful coexistence of departments of each of these
 disciplines in our science faculties, but also to the peaceful coexistence of the phe-
 nomena they posit at their various levels of description and explanation: not only do
 departments of economics and of theoretical physics both exist, but exchange rates
 and neutrinos both exist as well.
 This multiplicity of kinds of theories and of things sets much of the agenda for
 contemporary philosophy of science and metaphysics. For as soon as a categorial
 multiplicity is countenanced, there is an imperative either to reduce or to system-
 atize it. Is the multiplicity real, or only apparent? Is one level fundamental? Are the
 relations between the levels uniform? Ordered? What determines a level? And so on.
 Ontology and methodology become even more vexed when a single phenome-
 non appears to be explicable on multiple, prima facie orthogonal axes of explana-
 tion: is a movement of my arm to be explained by appeal to muscle contractions,
 neuromuscular synaptic events, and a neurophysiological story? Is it to be explained
 by reference to my beliefs and desires, by reference to the cultural practices of my
 fellows, or by reference to the need to greet a friend? If one level is to be privileged,
 which one, and why? But if multiple levels, how can such mutually independent,
 individually complete accounts of the necessary and sufficient conditions of the
 same object be equally acceptable?
 Now, as anyone who has even a passing familiarity with contemporary meta-
 physics and philosophy of science knows, debates about these issues quickly
 become baroque. But we can cut through the Gordian knot if we slice at the right
 angle, and here is where N~garjuna's analysis helps us; for all of these questions and
 Jay L. Garfield 511
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 puzzles can be sorted into two closely related, but nonetheless distinct classes: the
 ontological and the methodological. The first class asks to which entities and proper-
 ties we ought to commit ourselves. The second asks how we should understand the
 relationship between theories and explanations pitched at distinct levels of analysis.
 A Madhyamaka answer to questions of the first kind is a straightforward catholic
 realism: accept the deficits of economics, the kinship relations of anthropology, the
 classes of sociology, the beliefs of psychology, the molecules of chemistry, the
 niches of ecology, and the quarks of physics. Ndgarjuna's version of the Quinean
 dictum is that to be is to be the value of a bound variable is simply "to exist is to exist
 conventionally, dependently." The relevant conventions here are those of scientific
 theory, and the relevant dependencies are given by the laws discovered by science.
 From this perspective there is motivation to disparage neither the "high"-level phe-
 nomena of the social or biological sciences in favor of an ontological primacy
 accorded to the "low"-level phenomena of the physical sciences (see Churchland
 1978) nor the "unobservables" of the latter in favor of the manifest entities of the
 latter (van Fraassen 1980).
 For our purposes, it is important to see that this ontological generosity emerges
 precisely from Nagarjuna's analysis of causality and explanation. It is best to come at
 this through a via negativa or, as I should say in the present context, a prisanga:
 the urge to privilege one level over another always emerges in science and in the
 philosophy of science from a view about where genuine causation is to be found.
 We might, following Churchland (1978), argue that because genuine causation is
 physical causation, by virtue of real causal power inhering in subatomic particles,
 only the physical is really real, and all phenomena described at higher levels are real
 only to the extent that they are reducible to the physical. Or, following van Fraassen
 (1980), we might reject the unobservable because real causal laws connect observ-
 ables.3 In either case, we justify an ontological distinction based on a claim about
 where causal powers are to be located, and this because the only genuine explana-
 tions, explananda, and explanans are those respectively adverting to, deriving from,
 and possessing causal powers. But once we free ourselves from the thrall of this im-
 age of explanation and its ground, the motivation for these distinctions crumbles.
 Then we can pay attention to pratitya-samutpada-to interdependence and its mul-
 tiple, multidimensional, inter-level, and intra-level character-and let a thousand
 entities bloom, requiring of each that it genuinely toil and spin, accomplishing some
 real explanatory work.4
 Maintaining our focus on this notion of "explanatory work" as the bulwark
 against ontological profligacy, we can return to dispose quickly of the second class
 of puzzles noted above: those regarding not levels of ontology but levels of theory.
 Where competing explanations are offered, or where competing sciences vie as
 candidates to explain particular phenomena, which of these-other things being
 equal-should claim our theoretical allegiance? Of course, if we seriously believed
 in the cement of the universe, the answer to this question would be easy: the theory
 or the science founded in that very cement. The rest would then properly be
 regarded as pretenders or "what to do until the real science comes along." But if all
 512 Philosophy East & West
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 that explanation tracks is regularity and, as Ndgdrjuna would have it, the increas-
 ingly rich embedding of regularity, the answer to the query is equally simple: if other
 things are really equal, then take 'em all. Again, this does not mean that we should
 accept just any conjecture or explanation, together with the ontology it implicates.
 All of the standard desiderata of good theories apply-economy, elegance, pre-
 dictive power, confirmation, coherence with other theories, and so forth. The point
 is rather that these desiderata are all that matter. And that is because beyond pratitya-
 samutpdda there are no occult causal powers lurking as the unique and genuine
 targets of our theoretical activity.
 These issues are particularly sharp in cognitive science, where naturalistic, inten-
 tional explanations vie with eliminative and cognitive neuroscience, nonlinear dy-
 namic theory, computational models, and so forth. Now, many of these debates are
 straightforwardly empirical debates about how best to understand a particular cognitive
 phenomenon, and about whether a particular theory is successful on its own terms.
 Neither Ndgarjuna nor any other philosopher of science has anything to contribute to
 these debates. This is as it should be. These are all issues to be settled in the laboratory.
 But some (e.g., see Churchland 1978 and Fodor 1987, among many others)
 would resolve these debates on a priori grounds, arguing, for example, (1) because
 naturalistically individuated states cannot have causal powers they cannot explain
 anything and are not real psychological states, and so psychology must be individ-
 ualistic, or (2) because causation in the mind is ultimately a neural phenomenon,
 and so no phenomena other than those described in the language of neuroscience
 are psychologically real, that only neuropsychology is possible. Others (see Burge
 1979) argue that since all psychological phenomena are intentional, and since it is
 under intentional descriptions that they are causally active, psychological phenom-
 ena can only be individuated and explained naturalistically. To all of these, Ndgdr-
 juna's analysis of pratitya-samutpdda should lead us to answer, using a Sanskrit
 technical term from pramina theory, "fiddlesticks."
 As many philosophers of cognitive science have argued (see Garfield 1988, Hard-
 castle 1996, and von Eckardt 1995), many empirical domains comprise phenomena
 whose explanation must proceed simultaneously at distinct levels of description, using
 theories and vocabularies that are, while mutually consistent, methodologically
 orthogonal to one another. Such theories may be mutually irreducible, and their
 vocabularies often comprise terms indefinable in terms of theories at distinct levels. The
 only relations between such theories might be those of global supervenience. None of
 this, however, requires anything but robust realism regarding each level, and regarding
 the entities posited by each theory. Only a dogmatic ideology regarding the unity of
 science could lead one to any different conclusion.5 Nagarjuna would smile.
 Bodhicitta and Rebirth: A Heterodox Madhyamaka View
 So much for the profane. Now we will turn our gaze back to Buddhist metaphysics
 and epistemology proper. We will find that even in that domain the full import of
 N~garjuna's views has not always been appreciated. I will argue that a claim about
 Jay L. Garfield 513
This content downloaded from 131.229.64.25 on Fri, 03 Aug 2018 15:54:53 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 the preconditions for the cultivation of bodhicitta-the most ethically and soteriologi-
 cally significant motivational state in Mahdydna Buddhist ethics-that is taken as well
 established in the dGe lugs pa tradition of Tibetan Buddhism is in fact inconsistent with
 Nagarjuna's account of dependent arising, involves a subtle form of self-grasping, and
 so, by the lights of the tradition itself, should be rejected. That claim is this: the cultiva-
 tion of bodhicitta-the altruistic aspiration for buddhahood for the sake of the liber-
 ation of all sentient beings from samsara-requires the belief in rebirth.
 There is a hermeneutic fallacy in Western philosophy that I call "Farabi's
 fallacy," after its most spectacular exponent. It goes roughly like this: X was a really
 smart philosopher. Y was a really smart philosopher. Two such smart guys were
 undoubtedly both right. So, even though it might look like their views aren't consis-
 tent, they must be, and the task of a successful philosophical hermeneutics is to weld
 them together. Farabi tried it for Plato and Aristotle. Aquinas, inspired by that noble
 failure, tried it for God and Aristotle. In the Tibetan tradition the gold medal for
 Farabi's fallacy undoubtedly goes to the founder of the dGe lugs school, rJe Tsong
 khapa, who at some point said, "Ndgdrjuna-what a smart guy! DharmakTrti-what
 a smart guy! So, despite the fact that sunyavada and pramanavada might look like
 two vadas diverging in a yellow wood, they must be consistent." Tsong khapa
 (unlike Frost) devoted much of the rest of his philosophical life to the task of dem-
 onstrating and working out the consequences of their consistency, trying to take both
 roads simultaneously. Now, I have enormous admiration for Tsong khapa as a phi-
 losopher, and he is arguably the titan of the Tibetan philosophical tradition. But in
 this respect I find his influence less than salutary.
 The locus classicus for the dGe lugs argument for the conclusion that belief
 in rebirth is a necessary condition of the cultivation of bodhicitta is Tsong khapa's
 student rGyal tshab's commentary on the praminasiddhi chapter of DharmakTrti's
 Pramanavarttika. On reading this chapter one might well wonder why immediately after
 a discussion of bodhicitta Dharmakirti sets out to prove the existence of past and future
 lives. rGyal tshab's commentary on this passage explains this juxtaposition by setting up
 a materialist argument against the establishment of rebirth and argues that such a view is
 inconsistent with the cultivation of bodhicitta. The argument is interesting from our
 point of view not only because it is spectacularly bad, but also because its error consists
 precisely of its failure to appreciate the import of Nagarjuna's account of causality and
 its implications for the selflessness of the person. As a consequence we shall see
 DharmakTrti and rGyal tshab caught up in what I think of as the subtlest form of self-
 grasping a Buddhist could imagine, but a self-grasping nonetheless.
 [252.2] When the one endowed with great compassion became a sage, that required
 precursors: first, having developed a compassionate desire to free beings from all their
 sufferings, it was necessary for him to familiarize himself with a method for thoroughly
 pacifying the suffering in order to become a teacher.
 With respect to great compassion: it is arisen neither causelessly nor from irrelevant
 causes. It arises from previous familiarity with things of the same kind. Great compassion
 itself is what establishes one on the beginning of the practice of the Mahayana path.
 514 Philosophy East & West
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 [252.11] It isn't accomplished through familiarity with various kinds of compassion, and
 it doesn't come from prior births. That is because since the conceptual mind depends on
 the body, if the body is destroyed, the mind will be destroyed as well. For example, just
 as light comes from a lamp, it [mind] is the effect of a body, just as the ability to get drunk
 from beer is a characteristic of the body; just as a picture depends on the wall; through its
 very nature, it [mind] depends on it [body].
 [252.18] With respect to the conceptual mind: this body is neither its cause nor its sup-
 porting condition, and therefore the mind does not depend on it. This is because since
 that [the body] is the basis [of the mind and] can be refuted through reasoning, it will be
 rejected. Moreover, from giving reasons for the nonexistence of past and future lives
 [253] it would follow that familiarity with the arising of the various compassions would
 not be appropriate. Since this is not the case, through refutational reasoning this will be
 rejected. Therefore, since through good reasoning past and future lives are established, it
 follows from this-and on the fruit to be discussed below-that it is clearly established
 that one can obtain a favorable rebirth in a future life. Having proven this, and thus
 having established the Four Noble Truths, in that way one proves the excellent con-
 sequences of abandonment, of causes and effects, upon which beings of the three
 capacities should meditate in common. Thus [the practitioner,] adorned with constantly
 increasing boundless compassion, through having achieved a complete realization of the
 Four Noble Truths establishes the way to achieving omniscience.
 [253.17] With past and future lives having been well established
 And with their absence having been refuted
 Self is refuted and on that basis evil is abandoned.
 The argument in outline runs as follows. Great compassion (mahakarun5-the
 highest level of compassion achieved by the bodhisattva, characterized as com-
 passion in regarding sentient beings as empty of inherent existence) is essential to
 the enlightenment of a bodhisattva. It is also hard to achieve, requiring many
 rebirths in which one accumulates its causes, and in which one becomes fam-
 iliar with compassion and with the view that underlies it. Now, bodhicitta is the
 altruistic aspiration to gain enlightenment for the sake of other sentient beings,
 and a fortiori the aspiration to achieve this level of compassion. But that is only
 possible given many rebirths. So one cannot coherently develop this aspiration if
 one does not believe in the requisite rebirths. So even to develop bodhicitta one
 must believe in rebirth. This is the argument on which I want to focus, and note
 that it is independent of the preceding argument specifically for the existence of
 rebirth.
 Think about the bodhisattva resolution in any of its standard formulations: I will
 attain enlightenment for the sake of all sentient beings; or, in Santideva's more poetic
 words, from Bodhicaryavatira 10.55:
 For as long as space remains;
 For as long as transmigrators remain;
 So long will I myself remain, and thereby
 I will relieve all transmigrators' suffering. (Bodhicaryavatara 10:55)
 Jay L. Garfield 515
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 But who, or what, is this "I"? And what is its role in the expression of bodhicitta,
 particularly in the context of a Buddhist doctrine of anatman? Now, of course it is
 not intended to be a substantial self of the kind that all Madhyamikas reject. And we
 don't want simply to dismiss these formulas as confused or nonsensical, as a nihilist
 about the self might. But just noting that it is Madhyamaka's familiar conventionally
 real but ultimately nonexistent "mere I" will also be too facile. For, the argument we
 have just surveyed for the connection between belief in rebirth and the cultivation of
 bodhicitta hinges directly on the need to posit this "I" in past, present, and future
 lives as the basis of the causal continuum linking the extraordinarily many causes of
 buddhahood and the effect. It is, hence, doing real metaphysical work, well above
 and beyond what any "mere," nominally posited "I" could ever do: it is functioning
 as the basis for a real causal relation. If it were not needed for this, there would be no
 bar to a far simpler account of the aspiration for the liberation of all sentient beings
 (the one I will shortly defend) according to which the relevant aspiration is just that
 someone will attain Buddhahood, and that lots of people will have to do lots of stuff
 to make that possible. These causes will cooperate over time to enable the requisite
 enlightenment, and the practitioner resolves to contribute to that accumulation of
 causes. The fact that this option is not even considered by DharmakTrti or rGyal
 tshab suggests that another view of the relevant causal process is at work. Let us
 explore this in more detail.
 Following DharmakTrti, rGyal tshab takes himself to be responding directly to a
 materialist opponent who denies the reality of rebirth, arguing:
 It isn't accomplished through familiarity with various kinds of compassion, and it doesn't
 come from prior births. That is because since the conceptual mind depends on the body,
 if the body is destroyed, the mind will be destroyed as well. For example, just as light
 comes from a lamp, it [mind] is the effect of a body; just as the ability to get drunk from
 beer is a characteristic of the body; just as a picture depends on the wall; through its very
 nature, it [mind] depends on it [body].
 It is argued by rGyal tshab that there must be rebirth precisely because "[compas-
 sion] arises from previous familiarity with things of the same kind" and that "from
 giving reasons for the nonexistence of past and future lives it would follow that
 familiarity with the arising of the various compassions would not be appropriate."
 On the other hand, if, and only if, there is rebirth, he asserts that "adorned with
 constantly increasing boundless compassion, through having achieved a complete
 realization of the Four Noble Truths [the practitioner] establishes the way to
 achieving omniscience." That is, it is only personal rebirth-here defined explicitly
 in terms of a single mental continuum independent of the body-that for rGyal tshab
 (and DharmakTrti) and the subsequent dGe lugs pa tradition makes buddhahood
 possible, and so only a belief in this possibility could ground bodhicitta-the reso-
 lution to achieve buddhahood for the sake of sentient beings.
 Note that this implicates two specific theses: one regarding causality and
 one regarding the content of compassion. Both, I will argue, are misguided from a
 Madhyamaka perspective. The first, especially, is inconsistent with N~garjuna's own
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 account of causality. The second is implicated by it and is inconsistent with the
 doctrine of anatman.
 A central claim in rGyal tshab's argument is that without rebirth there cannot be
 any causal connection between the accumulating causes of bodhicitta and maha-
 karuni (accumulation of merit and wisdom and familiarization with compassion and
 its objects) and the crucial effect. That is why rGyal tshab can say that "from giving
 reasons for the nonexistence of past and future lives it would follow that familiarity
 with the arising of the various compassions would not be appropriate." And that is
 why he can say that the fact that there are past and future lives enables "the excel-
 lent consequences of abandonment, of causes and effects, [and] ... constantly
 increasing boundless compassion, through having achieved a complete realization
 of the Four Noble Truths establish[ing] the way to achieving omniscience."
 But why should rebirth be necessary to mediate this causal link? We (where
 "we" includes both DharmakTrti and rGyal tshab) are quite familiar with causal
 chains in which important causes are present in one group of entities and the effect
 in others (a tinderbox and flint give rise to a fire that burns in a candle and is used to
 light a lamp; a teacher's words together with the text in a book give rise to under-
 standing in the mind of a student; etc.). And this last provides a plausible alternative
 model for the accumulation of causes of mahakarund, bodhicitta, and omniscience:
 the acts, insights, writings, and discoveries of one individual make possible deeper
 insights, more profound realizations, and more informative writings on the part of
 another. Knowledge and compassion deepen over the generations, and, after a time,
 some individual attains buddhahood as a consequence of the accumulation of
 causes by others. Call this the transpersonal model of attainment, as opposed to the
 intrapersonal model embraced by the dGe lugs pa tradition, following DharmakTrti
 and rGyal tshab.
 The questions we must ask, then, are these: (1) Why does rGyal tshab embrace
 the intrapersonal rather than the transpersonal model? (2) Is his doing so consistent
 with Ngdgrjuna's account of causation? I think that the answer to the first is obvious,
 and this is confirmed by the oral tradition:6 only an interpersonal continuum could
 mediate the connections between the relevant causes and effects. Remove this
 premise and the argument loses all plausibility. After all, given that it is reasonable to
 believe that buddhahood is difficult to achieve, one could argue convincingly that
 bodhicitta requires a belief in the past and the future, but not in one's own past and
 future lives, unless one thought that the relevant causal chain could only be intra-
 personal. But why would rGyal tshab believe that? Well, the only reason I can come
 up with is that he thinks that causation requires a substantial basis-something in
 which the causal powers inhere. That basis, for rGyal tshab, would be the mental
 continuum or subtle consciousness that continues across rebirths.
 And that implausible view leads us to the next question: is that consistent with
 N~garjuna's account of causation, which rGyal tshab and the dGe lugs tradition also
 endorse? No, of course not. For N~g~rjuna, insisting on the emptiness of causation,
 insists precisely on the absence of the need for any causal powers or for any sub-
 stantial basis for causal chains. Causation is re-described in his Madhyamaka anal-
 Jay L. Garfield 517
This content downloaded from 131.229.64.25 on Fri, 03 Aug 2018 15:54:53 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 ysis as a matter of explanatorily useful regularities, and the notion of explanatory
 utility is further unpacked in terms of the embedding of regularities in further regu-
 larities. None of this requires the genidentity of the objects participating in cause and
 effect. Nor should it, as countless counterexamples show. Here the Carvaka oppo-
 nent seems to get things just right: "It isn't accomplished through familiarity with
 various kinds of compassion, and it doesn't come from prior births. That is because
 since the conceptual mind depends on the body, if the body is destroyed, the mind
 will be destroyed as well." Or at least it could be like that.
 Moreover, returning to the second thesis central to rGyal tshab's account-
 concerning the content of compassion-it would be more in harmony with the
 Mahdydna understanding of anatman (also defended forcefully by Ndgdrjuna in the
 Malamadhyamakakarika) to see it like that. This brings us back to the status of the "1"
 in verses like Santideva's and the real content of bodhicitta and the mahakaruna that
 it comprises. The aim and the motivation of bodhicitta is the alleviation of the suf-
 fering of all sentient beings. That is beyond question. It also comprises the view that
 only a buddha could accomplish this task, given its stupendous difficulty. Moreover,
 bodhicitta is more than a mere wish that a buddha arise and that thereby sentient
 beings be released from suffering; it is an altruistic aspiration to bring this about. And
 the notion of "bringing about" is, of course, ineliminably causal. One can see, then,
 how if one thought about causality in terms of substantial supporting bases of causal
 chains one would then be led to believe that the only way one could bring about the
 arising of a buddha for the sake of other sentient beings is to set about becoming one
 oneself, and the only way one could rationally adopt that objective would be to
 believe in past and future lives-and the rest follows.
 But once we have shed the reified view of causality that Nagarjuna so forcefully
 criticizes, this argument crumbles. And once we accept something like the trans-
 mission of knowledge as an analogy for a transpersonal causal chain linking epis-
 temic and moral causes with their soteriological effects, we can see that the "I" as
 a future-tense subject in the bodhisattva resolution is gratuitous. I must develop an
 altruistic resolve to do something; that something-if we accept more Buddhist
 soteriological theory about the necessity of a buddha's capabilities for the task at
 hand-might be to bring about enlightenment (or at least to contribute to bringing it
 about); but that enlightenment need not be mine. And if it need not, there is no
 entailment at all between bodhicitta properly understood and rebirth.
 Nor should there be. For now we can see that to confuse an altruistic impersonal
 aspiration for enlightenment for the sake of sentient beings with an aspiration for
 one's own enlightenment-to confuse a conviction that there is a future for the sake
 of which one should work with the view that it is one's own future-is a serious,
 though subtle form of atmanvada or even atmangraha. The reason is this: the "1" that
 is posited here is posited not merely as a conventionally designated continuum, but
 as a substratum for a causal process. My dGe lugs proponent at this point-accusing
 me of nihilism about the self-will protest that the "1" so posited is a mere "1" ("nga"
 tsam) as opposed to a substantial self. But simply to say that this is what is going
 on doesn't make it so. Here's the difference: a mere "1" doesn't do any metaphy-
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 sical work-it serves as a conventionally posited imputation with no convention-
 independent identity conditions, and no explanatory value. CandrakTrti (1989, 1994)
 as well as Nagarjuna and later Tsong khapa (1984, 1988) make this point with great
 force. But the "I" posited here-the "I myself" (bdag ni) of Santideva, the one that is
 reborn for rGyal tshab-has work to do. It explains causation, something that neither
 Nagarjuna is in need of an explanation of nor is capable of being explained. To posit
 such a substantial substrate and then to stake the meaning of one's moral life on
 its continuation through time is to fall back from a view of emptiness into a barely
 disguised substantialism about the self. Only by opting for a more impersonal
 bodhicitta, a more impersonally bodhisattva resolution, can the Mahdydna remain
 consistently Madhyamaka.
 I have heard three further objections to this account from dGe lugs pa interlocu-
 tors. Let me rehearse and respond to each quickly before turning to my conclusion.
 (1) In your view, it doesn't matter what I do in this life-whether I am Hitler or
 Mother Theresa, and this for two reasons: (a) If I am not going to exist in the future, I
 have no moral incentive to be good; after all, I will neither reap the benefits of
 morally good actions nor suffer the consequences of morally bad actions. (b) Either
 kind of life might lead to benefits in the future, so there is no intrinsic reason to prefer
 a good life to a bad one. The answer in each case is simple. Concerning the first
 objection, if your only motivation for leading a good life is your own benefit in the
 future, your motivation is not that of a bodhisattva in the first place. We are consid-
 ering the necessary conditions of bodhicitta, after all, not of self-interest. Concerning
 the second, the reason for thinking that Mother Theresa's life will be more likely to
 lead to universal moral improvement and enlightenment than Hitler's is not intrinsic
 by anyone's reckoning: it is causal (and although fallible, plausible). We think that it
 is simply more likely that lives like hers generate the relevant moral benefits better
 than lives like his. If we thought otherwise, altruism might require strange things
 of us.7
 Others object (2) that there are plenty of independent reasons to accept rebirth
 (DharmakTrti and rGyal tshab would agree). Maybe so. Maybe not. It doesn't matter,
 I say, for the present purposes. My question is this: do you need to believe in rebirth
 in order to generate bodhicitta? Just as it is true both that there are nine planets and
 that it is unnecessary to believe this in order to cultivate bodhicitta, it may be true
 that there is rebirth. But even if it is, I have argued that it is unnecessary to believe
 this in order to cultivate bodhicitta. It is only the entailment that is at issue between
 rGyal tshab and me at this point.8
 Finally, some of my dGe lugs pa colleagues ask, (3) if there is no rebirth, how
 does anyone get to the point of buddhahood, given the stupendous difficulty, or,
 indeed, to the point of generating bodhicitta, given its still impressive difficulty? Here
 I give the same answer I would give regarding how Kant wrote his Critique or how
 Einstein discovered relativity: by taking advantage of the accomplishments of those
 who go before. (Note that this is also a very plausible and a very attractive way of
 understanding refuge in Buddhist practice.) And that has been the burden of the
 foregoing argument.
 Jay L. Garfield 519
This content downloaded from 131.229.64.25 on Fri, 03 Aug 2018 15:54:53 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 John Powers (personal communication) argues that the real reason for requiring
 a belief in past and future lives is the fact that since the bodhisattva vow requires one
 to work to attain buddhahood for the sake of all sentient beings, and since many of
 these sentient beings, in my view, fail to exist now (they have died), and since others
 will exist only far into the future, the vow would be incoherent. You can't, he argues,
 save sentient beings who no longer exist from anything, and a Buddha who then dies
 can't save future beings. In fact, he argues, if you don't believe in future lives, the
 best way to rescue all sentient beings from suffering is to kill them all, right now.
 These would be unacceptable consequences, of course. But they do not follow.
 Powers' charges, however, do force a careful examination of the content of the vow
 and of the aspiration as I must understand them. Bodhicitta must, in my view, be
 directed only to actual sentient beings, present and future. One cannot hope to do
 anything for the dead. That does, to be sure, reduce the scope of this moral aspira-
 tion, but only realistically so. With regard to the future, things are less dreary. The
 buddha that one strives to bring into the world, I would hope, would help not only
 her contemporaries but also her successors, just as the discoveries of medicines and
 vaccines help those who follow (the epithet "the great doctor" is a common way
 of referring to Siddhartha Gautama, and has just this connotation). Finally, while
 killing all sentient beings might indeed relieve suffering, it does not thereby bring out
 happiness, and bodhicitta surely is the aspiration to bring about happiness as well.
 "May all sentient beings be happy" is, after all, among the most common Mahdydna
 colophons. I conclude that Powers' objections fail.
 If I am right about this, the doctrine of rebirth is of considerably less importance
 to Buddhism-especially to Mahdydna Buddhism-than it is generally taken to be.9
 I take this as confirmation of my view. That doctrine, after all, is an import from an
 ambient Hindu culture. Buddhism jettisons a great deal of the central ideology of
 that culture, including, prominently, the ideal of atman; there is no reason to think
 that this part should survive, especially if it can be shown both to be inessential to
 the central moral theses definitive of the Mahdydna and to be inconsistent with its
 central insights-those of anatman and of the emptiness of causation.10
 Conclusions
 I have referred to these distinct sets of implications of Ndgdrjuna's views on causa-
 tion as those for the profane and those for the sacred. But I could easily have
 adopted a more traditional classification of consequences: those pertaining to the
 selflessness of phenomena and those pertaining to the selflessness of persons. In
 each case, Ndgdrjuna draws our attention to the subtle and seductive reification that
 comes to us so naturally, and to the extent to which our thinking about causation is
 implicated in that reification.
 It is almost impossible to resist the temptation to seek to go beyond the merely
 interdependent and to posit some hidden glue-some cement of the universe-that
 holds in place not only the external world but the self, and that ensures the regular
 transition from link to link. "Surely," we think, driven by our deepest cognitive
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 instincts, "even if everything we encounter is merely interdependent, that inter-
 dependence itself must have some substantial basis." But that commitment, when
 seen from the opposite side of the Madhyamaka dialectic, becomes the more insid-
 ious "surely, even if everything we encounter is empty, that emptiness must be truly
 existent." And once we commit that fallacy, we are set on the royal road to nihilism
 about the world in which we lead our lives, and to untenable realism about
 the transcendent. It then becomes impossible to make any sense at all of empirical
 reality or of its emptiness. So, tempting as the glue view is, it merely traps us in an
 inescapable web of metaphysical illusion.
 Ndgdrjuna's analysis is powerful not only because it dissolves the hidden glue
 we instinctively posit to give coherence to our world, but also because it demon-
 strates the pernicious consequences of positing that glue. While a theory about
 causation-even a prereflective theory-might seem to be but a recherche corner of
 metaphysics and the philosophy of science, it in fact infects and determines our view
 of everything else-from the philosophy of science to the philosophy of mind to
 cosmology to ethics. Getting clear about causality is indeed a prerequisite to getting
 clear about everything else; it is true that a world without inner and outer glue dis-
 integrates. Nothing holds the self together; nothing holds causes to their effects. Raw
 interdependence is all we encounter, and there is no hope of an explanation to end
 all explanations. That is the manifestation in the philosophy of science and in the
 existential understanding of the nature of self of the abyss of emptiness into which
 D6gen much later commands us to leap. But that leap is a leap into emptiness, and
 not into nihilism: just as D6gen reassures us that in facing interdependence in this
 way the self and all things are affirmed, we have seen that in facing the emptiness of
 interdependence while the inefficacious occult cement of the universe vanishes, the
 empirical world and the possibility of meaningful life therein are affirmed. The mere
 interdependence provides all the coherence one could coherently desire.
 Notes
 Thanks to Arindam Chakrabarti for provoking me, to the Ven. Geshe Ngawang
 Samten for debating this issue, to Guy Newland and Mark Siderits for valuable con-
 tributions to the ensuing discussion from which this article has emerged, and to Mark
 for a valuable set of comments on an earlier draft. Thanks also to Georges Dreyfus
 for sending crucial texts, and to the Ven. Sonam Thackch6e for checking and cor-
 recting translations and for further discussion of these issues. I also thank Cynthia
 Townley and Tricia Perry for editorial assistance.
 1 - I will not use the pejorative term "antirealist," for, in the context of Mad-
 hyamaka, that begs important questions both about the appropriate sense of
 "reality" and about what kinds of phenomena we might identify about which
 to be realists. Moreover, for a Prasanrgika-Madhyamika like Ndgarjuna, there is
 an additional problem: how do we identify the common object necessary to
 generate a realist/antirealist debate?
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 2 - Note that while this objection might appear to be a version of Smart's (1963)
 "cosmic coincidence" argument for scientific realism, it is not. For Nagarjuna
 would agree with Smart that one must be (conventionally) realistic about any-
 thing one posits in an explanation. His claim is simply that in fact we never
 really posit causal powers in explanations (compare Tsong khapa 1984 and
 1998 on the question of whether for a Prdsanigika-unlike a Svatantrika-we
 posit inherent existence even conventionally). The cosmic coincidence argu-
 ment really does have its home in realism/antirealism debates, and this is not
 one of those. The question here is whether or not the concept of causal powers
 actually has any content. The reificationist claims that it does, Ndgdrjuna that it
 does not.
 3 - The contemporary philosophers most explicit about this justification for onto-
 logical discrimination in science are Jerry Fodor (1984) and Paul Churchland
 (1978).
 4 - See also Kitcher 1993 for another contemporary argument for the claim that
 causal claims are grounded in explanations rather than vice versa. I thank Mark
 Siderits for calling this parallel to my attention.
 5 - Mark Siderits (personal communication) charges me with adopting my own
 dogmatic ideology of the disunity of science, by virtue of underestimating or
 ignoring future theoretical unifications of the domains of these diverse
 sciences. This is not the place to fight this larger battle in the philosophy of
 science. I have said my piece elsewhere (Garfield 1988, unpublished). Briefly,
 though, while I endorse a broadly physicalistic view of the supervenience of
 the domains and theories of higher-level sciences on those of more funda-
 mental sciences (e.g., psychology vs. physics), such supervenience does not
 entail for supervening sciences and domains either reduction to or absorption
 by the more fundamental sciences or domains, and the frequently relational,
 normative, or gerrymandered character of the ontologies and methodologies of
 higher-level sciences often blocks such reduction or subsumption. Multiple
 styles and axes of explanations are often necessary in order to capture the
 irregular, multilevel character of reality (see also Hardcastle 1996). Of course,
 this point depends to a certain degree on what one counts as reduction. If re-
 duction is to be distinguished, as I (1988) and others (see Hardcastle 1996
 and Churchland 1978, to cite but two examples) have argued they must be,
 reduction cannot simply be defined as global supervenience. Whether it is
 understood as a Nagel-style reduction by biconditional bridge laws or inter-
 level definitions, a systematic reduction as in Haugeland 1981 or Cummins
 1983, or the preservation of roughly equipotent theoretical images (Churchland
 1978, Hardcastle 1996), the point goes through: ontological dependence does
 not entail reducibility.
 6 - The Ven. Geshe Ngawang Samten, personal communication, and the Ven.
 Sonam Thackch5e, personal communication.
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 7 - And the Jltaka tales include stories of the Buddha doing prima facie rather bad
 things precisely because on those rare occasions they conduce to the more
 rapid spiritual benefit of others.
 8 - I leave open the option of fighting the other issue out later.
 9 - The Ven. Geshe Ngawang Samten (personal communication) points out that
 another reason for thinking that belief in rebirth is necessary in order to culti-
 vate bodhicitta: one of the principal means of cultivation is the practice of vis-
 ualizing all sentient beings as one's mother in past lives and developing
 a feeling of gratitude for their past kindness. If this method were necessary
 for cultivating bodhicitta, then a belief in past lives would also be necessary for
 cultivating bodhicitta. But he also points out that this is not the only method
 for cultivating bodhicitta that is recommended in the tradition, and that the
 exchange of self for others does not require this belief, and this is widely
 regarded as sufficient.
 10 - Mark Siderits (personal communication) notes that I, like DharmakTrti and
 rGyal tshab, rely on causal processes to explain the possibility of Buddhahood,
 and so that I, like them, presuppose some confidence in causation as a ground
 of the possibility of bodhicitta, even as I reconceptualize that aspiration. So, he
 suggests, my view is really no different from theirs. Not so. There is a big dif-
 ference: whereas the orthodox view I criticize requires (notwithstanding its
 own protestations to the contrary) a substantial basis for a causal relation, and
 hence more than mere pratitya-samutpdda, and something like kriya (bya ba)
 proper of the kind Ndgarjuna so properly rejects, my account merely requires
 the kind of causal dependence with which Ndgdrjuna properly suggests we
 should replace causal power and substance talk. What is at issue, I repeat, is
 neither faith in the existence of the past and the future nor the view that Bud-
 dhahood has causes and is difficult to achieve, but rather the claim that per-
 sonal rebirth is a necessary condition of enlightenment and hence that faith
 therein is a necessary condition of bodhicitta. And here we differ.
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